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Abstract
Person re-identification (re-ID) has attracted much at-
tention recently due to its great importance in video surveil-
lance. In general, distance metrics used to identify two
person images are expected to be robust under various ap-
pearance changes. However, our work observes the extreme
vulnerability of existing distance metrics to adversarial ex-
amples, generated by simply adding human-imperceptible
perturbations to person images. Hence, the security dan-
ger is dramatically increased when deploying commercial
re-ID systems in video surveillance.
Although adversarial examples have been extensively
applied for classification analysis, it is rarely studied in
metric analysis like person re-identification. The most likely
reason is the natural gap between the training and test-
ing of re-ID networks, that is, the predictions of a re-
ID network cannot be directly used during testing without
an effective metric. In this work, we bridge the gap by
proposing Adversarial Metric Attack, a parallel method-
ology to adversarial classification attacks. Comprehen-
sive experiments clearly reveal the adversarial effects in
re-ID systems. Meanwhile, we also present an early at-
tempt of training a metric-preserving network, thereby de-
fending the metric against adversarial attacks. At last, by
benchmarking various adversarial settings, we expect that
our work can facilitate the development of adversarial at-
tack and defense in metric-based applications. The code is
available at https://github.com/SongBaiHust/
Adversarial_Metric_Attack.
1. Introduction
In recent years, person re-identification (re-ID) [22, 50]
has attracted great attention in the computer vision commu-
nity, driven by the increasing demand of video surveillance
in public space. Hence, great effort has been devoted to
developing robust re-ID features [8, 15, 38, 9, 26] and dis-
tance metrics [35, 51, 29, 7] to overcome the large intra-
class variations of person images in viewpoint, pose, illu-
mination, blur, occlusion and resolution. For example, the
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Figure 1. The illustration of the adversarial effect in person re-
identification. Given a probe image, its similarity with the true
positive is decreased from 0.829 to 0.105, and that with the true
negative is increased from 0.120 to 0.803 by adding human-
imperceptible noise to gallery images. The adversarial noise is
resized to the range [0, 1] for visualization.
rank-1 accuracy of the latest state-of-the-art on the Market-
1501 dataset [49] is 93.8 [28], increasing rapidly from 44.4
when the dataset was first released in 2015.
However, we draw researchers’ attention to the fact that
re-ID systems can be very vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
Fig. 1 shows a case where a probe image is presented. Of
the two gallery images, the true positive has a large similar-
ity value and the true negative has a small one. Neverthe-
less, after adding human-imperceptible perturbations to the
gallery images, the metric is easily fooled even though the
new gallery images appear the same as the original ones.
Adversarial examples have been extensively investi-
gated in classification analysis, such as image classifica-
tion [24, 6], object detection [44], semantic segmenta-
tion [1], etc. However, they have not attracted much atten-
tion in the field of re-ID, a metric analysis task whose basic
goal is to learn a discriminative distance metric. A very
likely reason is the existence of a natural gap between the
training and testing of re-ID networks. While a re-ID model
is usually trained with a certain classification loss, it dis-
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Figure 2. The failure case (a) of classification attack and the suc-
cessful case (b) of metric attack on two clean images (blue color).
The adversarial examples (red color) generated by the classifica-
tion attack cross over the class decision boundary, but preserve the
pairwise distance between them to a large extent.
cards the concept of class decision boundaries during test-
ing and adopts a metric function to measure the pairwise
distances between the probe and gallery images. Conse-
quently, previous works on classification attacks [24, 6] do
not generalize to re-ID systems, i.e., they attempt to push
images across the class decision boundaries and do not nec-
essarily lead to a corrupted pairwise distance between im-
ages (see Fig. 2). Note that some re-ID networks are di-
rectly guided by metric losses (e.g., contrastive loss [16]),
and their output can measure the between-object distances.
However, it is still infeasible to directly attack such output
owing to the sampling difficulty and computational com-
plexity. Therefore, a common practice in re-ID is to take the
trained model as a feature extractor and measure the simi-
larities in a metric space.
Considering the importance of security for re-ID sys-
tems and the lack of systematic studies on its robustness
towards adversarial examples, we propose Adversarial Met-
ric Attack, an efficient and generic methodology to generate
adversarial examples by attacking metric learning systems.
The contributions of this work can be divided into five folds
1) Our work presents what to our knowledge is the first sys-
tematic and rigorous investigation of adversarial effects in
person re-identification, which should be taken into con-
sideration when deploying re-ID algorithms in real surveil-
lance systems.
2) We propose adversarial metric attack, a parallel method-
ology to the existing adversarial classification attack [39,
14], which can be potentially applied to other safety-critical
applications that rely on distance metric (e.g., face verifica-
tion [40] and tracking [18]).
3) We define and benchmark various experimental settings
for metric attack in re-ID, including white-box and black-
box attack, non-targeted and targeted attack, single-model
and multi-model attack, etc. Under those experimental set-
tings, comprehensive experiments are carried out with dif-
ferent distance metrics and attack methods.
4) We present an early attempt on adversarial metric de-
fense, and show that adversarial examples generated by
attacking metrics can be used in turn to train a metric-
preserving network.
5) The code will be publicly available to easily generate
the adversarial version of benchmark datasets (see exam-
ples in supplementary material), which can serve as a useful
testbed to evaluate the robustness of re-ID algorithms.
We hope that our work can facilitate the development of
robust feature learning and accelerate the progress on adver-
sarial attack and defense of re-ID systems with the method-
ology and the experimental conclusions presented.
2. Related Work
Adversarial learning [21, 42, 48, 36] has been incorpo-
rated into the training procedure of re-ID systems in many
previous works. In these works, generative adversarial net-
works (GAN) [13] typically acts as a data augmentation
strategy by generating photo-realistic person images to en-
hance the training set. For example, Zheng et al. [52] ap-
plied GAN to generate unlabeled images and assigned a
uniform label distribution during training. Wei et al. [43]
proposed Person Transfer Generative Adversarial Network
(PTGAN) to bridge the gap between different datasets.
Moreover, Ge et al. [11] propose Feature Distilling Genera-
tive Adversarial Network to learn identity-related and pose-
unrelated representations. In [33], binary codes are learned
for efficient pedestrian matching via the proposed Adver-
sarial Binary Coding.
However, to the best of our knowledge, no prior work
has rigorously considered the robustness of re-ID systems
towards adversarial attacks, which have received wide at-
tention in the context of classification-based tasks, includ-
ing image classification [24], object detection [44] and se-
mantic segmentation [1]. As these vision tasks aims to sort
an instance into a category, they are therefore special cases
of the broader classification problem. On such systems,
it has been demonstrated that adding carefully generated
human-imperceptible perturbations to an input image can
easily cause the network to misclassify the perturbed image
with high confidence. These tampered images are known
as adversarial examples. Great efforts have been devoted
to the generation of adversarial examples [14, 24, 6]. In
contrast, our work focuses on adversarial attacks on metric
learning systems, which analyze the relationship between
two instances.
3. Adversarial Metric Attack
Person re-identification [12] is comprised of three sets of
images, including the probe set P = {pi}Npi=1, the gallery set
X = {xi}Nxi=1, and the training set Y = {yi}Nyi=1. A label
set L is also given to annotate the identity of each image
for training and evaluation. A general re-ID pipeline is: 1)
learn a feature extractor F with parameters Θ (usually by
training a neural network) by imposing a loss function J
to L and Y; 2) extract the activations of intermediate layers
for P and X as their visual features F(P,Θ) and F(X,Θ),
respectively; 3) compute the distance between F(P,Θ) and
F(X,Θ) for indexing. When representing features, F(·)
and Θ are omitted where possible for notation simplicity.
In this paper, we aim to generate adversarial examples
for re-ID models. As explained in Sec. 1, a different at-
tack mechanism is required for metric learning systems
as opposed to the existing attack methods which focus on
classification-based models [14, 24]. Instead of attacking
the loss function used in training the neural network as
done in these previous works, we discard the training loss
and propose to attack the distance metric. Such an attack
mechanism directly results in the corruption of the pairwise
distance between images, thus leading to guaranteed accu-
racy compromises of a re-ID system. This is the gist of the
methodology proposed in this work, which we call adver-
sarial metric attack.
Adversarial metric attack consists of four components,
including models for attack, metrics for attack, methods for
attack and adversarial settings for attack. In the first com-
ponent (Sec. 3.1), we train the model (with parameters Θ)
on the training set Y as existing re-ID algorithms do. The
model parameters are then fixed during attacking. In the
second component (Sec. 3.2), a metric loss D is determined
as the attack target. In the third component (Sec. 3.3), an
optimization method for producing adversarial examples is
selected. In the last component (Sec. 3.4), by setting the
probe set P as a reference, we generate adversarial exam-
ples on the gallery set X in a specific adversarial setting.
3.1. Models for Attack
In the proposed methodology, the model for attack is not
limited to be classification-based as opposed to [14, 24]. In-
stead, most re-ID models [19, 4, 37, 31] can be used. We
only review two representative baseline models, which are
commonly seen in person re-identification.
Cross Entropy Loss. The re-ID model is trained with the
standard cross-entropy loss and the labels are the identities
of training images. It is defined as
J(Y,L) = −
∑
i
∑
j
1 (l(yi) = j) log q
j
i , (1)
where qji is the classification probability of the i-th training
sample to the j-th category and l(yi) is the ground-truth
label of yi ∈ Y.
Triplet Loss. The re-ID model is trained with the triplet
loss, defined as
J(Y,L) =
∑
la=lp 6=ln
[d(ya, yp)− d(ya, yn) +m]+, (2)
where ya denotes the anchor point, yp denotes the positive
point and yn denotes the negative point. The motivation is
that the positive yp belonging to the same identity as the
anchor ya is closer to ya than the negative yn belonging to
another identity, by at least a margin m.
3.2. Metrics for Attack
Metric learning (e.g., XQDA [29], KISSME [23]) has
dominated the landscape of re-ID for a long time. Mathe-
matically, a metric defined between the probe set P and the
gallery set X is a function D : P×X→ [0,∞), which as-
signs non-negative values for each pair of p ∈ P and x ∈ X.
We also use notation d(p, x) to denote the distance between
p and x in the metric space D. In this section, we give the
formal definition of metric loss used in adversarial metric
attack. It should be mentioned that any differentiable met-
ric (or similarity) function can be used as the target loss.
Euclidean distance is a widely used distance metric. The
metric loss is defined as
d(p, x) = ‖p− x‖22, (3)
which computes the squared Euclidean distance between p
and x.
Mahalanobis distance is a generalization of the Euclidean
distance that considers the correlation of different feature
dimensions. Accordingly, we can have a metric loss as
d(p, x) = (p− x)TM(p− x), (4)
where M is a positive semidefinite matrix.
3.3. Methods for Attack
Given a metric loss defined above, we aim at learning an
adversarial example xadv = x + r, where x ∈ X denotes a
certain gallery image and r denotes the adversarial pertur-
bation. L∞ norm is used to measure the perceptibility of
the perturbation, i.e., ‖r‖∞ ≤  and  is a small constant.
To this end, we introduce the following three attack
methods, including:
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [14] is a single step
attack method. It generates adversarial examples by
Xadv = X +  · sign
(
∂D(P,X)
∂X
)
, (5)
where  measures the maximum magnitude of adversarial
perturbation and sign(·) denotes the signum function.
Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (I-FGSM) [24] is
an iterative version of FGSM, defined as{
Xadv0 = X
Xadvn+1 = Ψ

X
(
Xadvn + α · sign(∂D(P,X
adv
n )
∂Xadvn
)
)
,
(6)
where n denotes the iteration number and α is the step size.
ΨX is a clip function that ensures the generated adversarial
example is within the -ball of the original image.
Momentum Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (MI-
FGSM) [6] adds the momentum term on top of I-FGSM to
stabilize update directions. It is defined asgn+1 = µ · gn +
∂D(P,Xadvn )
∂Xadvn
/∥∥∥∥∂D(P,Xadvn )∂Xadvn
∥∥∥∥
1
Xadvn+1 = Ψ

X
(
Xadvn + α · sign(gn+1)
)
,
(7)
where µ is the decay factor of the momentum term and gn
is the accumulated gradient at the n-th iteration.
3.4. Benchmark Adversarial Settings
In this section, we benchmark the experimental settings
for adversarial metric attack in re-ID .
3.4.1 White-box and Black-box Attack
White-box attack requires the attackers to have prior
knowledge of the target networks, which means that the
adversarial examples are generated with and tested on the
same network having parameters Θ.
It should be mentioned that for adversarial metric attack,
the loss layer used during training is replaced by the metric
loss when attacking the network.
Black-box attack means that the attackers do not know the
structures or the weights of the target network. That is to
say, the adversarial examples are generated with a network
having parameters Θ and used to attack metric on another
network which differs in structures, parameters or both.
3.4.2 Targeted and Non-targeted Attack
Non-targeted attack aims to widen the metric distance be-
tween image pairs of the same identity. Given a probe image
p and a gallery image x, where l(p) = l(x), their distance
d(p, x) is ideally small. After imposing a non-targeted at-
tack on the distance metric, the distance d(p, xadv) between
p and the generated adversarial example xadv is enlarged.
Hence, when p serves as the query, xadv will not be ranked
high in the ranking list of p (see Fig. 4(a)).
Non-targeted attack can be achieved by applying the at-
tack methods described in Sec. 3.3 to the metric losses de-
scribed in Sec. 3.2.
Targeted attack aims to draw the gallery image towards
the probe image in the metric space. This type of attack
is usually performed on image pairs with different identi-
ties, i.e., l(p) 6= l(x), which correspond to a large d(p, x)
value. The generated xadv becomes closer to the query im-
age p in the metric space, deceiving the network into pre-
dicting l(xadv) = l(p). Hence, one can frequently observe
adversarial examples generated by a targeted attack in top
positions of the ranking list of p (see Fig. 4(b)).
Unlike non-targeted attack where adversarial examples
do not steer the network towards a specific identity, targeted
attack finds adversarial perturbations with pre-determined
target labels during the learning procedure and tries to de-
crease the value of objective function. This incurs a slight
modification to the attack methods described in Sec. 3.3.
For example, the formulation of FGSM [14] is changed to
Xadv = X−  · sign
(
∂D(P,X)
∂X
)
. (8)
The update procedure of I-FGSM [24] and MI-FGSM [6]
can be modified similarly.
3.4.3 Single-model and Multi-model Attack
Single-model attack differs from Multi-model attack in
that the former only uses one network to learn the adver-
sarial examples, while the latter uses multiple ones. It has
been shown in the context of adversarial classification at-
tacks [32] that an ensemble of multiple models is crucial to
the transferability of the adversarial examples. Thus, multi-
model methods generally perform better under the black-
box setting.
To ensemble multiple networks, we suggest to average
the metric losses defined in Sec. 3.2. The logits or predic-
tions of networks are not used in the multi-model metric at-
tack, since they do not necessarily have the same dimension
in contrast with the case in classification attack [6].
4. Adversarial Metric Defense
Here we present an early attempt on training a metric-
preserving network to defend a distance metric.
The procedure is divided into four steps: 1) learn a clean
model F with parameters Θ by imposing a loss function J
to L and Y; 2) perform adversarial metric attack described
in Sec. 3 on F with the training set Y, then obtain the ad-
versarial version of training set Yadv; 3) merge Y and Yadv,
and re-train a metric-preserving model Fadv; 4) use Fadv as
the testing model in replace of F.
As for the performance, we find that Fadv closely
matches F when testing on the original (clean) gallery set
X, but significantly outperforms F when testing on the ad-
versarial version of gallery set Xadv. In this sense, re-ID
systems gain the robustness to adversarial metric attacks.
5. Experiments
The section evaluates the proposed adversarial metric at-
tack and adversarial metric defense.
Datasets. Market-1501 dataset [49] is a widely accepted
benchmark for person re-ID. It consists of 1501 identities,
Methods
Market-1501 DukeMTMC-reID
Rank-1 mAP Rank-1 mAP
B1 91.30 77.52 82.85 67.72
B2 91.44 78.21 83.03 67.85
B3 91.95 79.08 83.34 68.30
B4 84.29 67.86 76.57 57.31
[28] 90.56 75.28 80.70 64.44
[41] 93.17 82.50 85.23 72.89
Table 1. The performances of the four base models and two state-
of-the-art methods implemented in this work. The reproduced per-
formances of [28, 41] are slightly different from those reported in
the original work.
in which 750 identities (12, 936 images) are used for train-
ing, 751 identities (19, 732 images) for testing and 3, 368
images for querying. DukeMTMC-reID dataset [52] has
36, 411 images taken by 8 cameras. The training set has
16, 522 images (702 identities). The testing set has 2, 228
probe images (702 identities) and 17, 661 gallery images.
Both Cumulative Matching Characteristics (CMC)
scores and mean average precision (mAP) are used for per-
formance evaluation.
Baselines. Four base models are implemented. Specifically,
we take ResNet-50 [17], ResNeXt-50 [45] and DenseNet-
121 [20] pretrained on ImageNet [5] as the backbone mod-
els. The three networks are supervised by the cross-entropy
loss, yielding three base models denoted as B1, B2 and B3,
respectively. Meanwhile, we also supervise ResNet-50 [17]
with triplet loss [19] and obtain the base model B4.
All the models are trained using the Adam optimizer for
60 epochs with a batch size of 32. When testing, we extract
the L2 normalized activations from the networks before the
loss layer as the image features.
State-of-the-art Methods. As there exists a huge number
of re-ID algorithms [3, 2, 27, 10, 30, 47, 46], it is unreal-
istic to evaluate all of them. Here, we reproduce two rep-
resentatives which achieve the latest state-of-the-art perfor-
mances, i.e., Harmonious Attention CNN (HACNN) [28]
and Multi-task Attentional Network with Curriculum Sam-
pling (Mancs) [41]. Both of them employ attention mech-
anisms to address person misalignment. We follow the de-
fault settings correspondingly and report their performances
as well as those of the four base models in Table 1.
Experimental Design. The design of experiments involves
various settings, including different distance metrics, differ-
ent attack methods, white-box and black-box attack, non-
targeted and targeted attack and single-model and multi-
model attack described in Sec. 3.
If not specified otherwise, we use the Euclidean distance
defined in Eq. (3) as the metric and I-FGSM defined in
Eq. (6) with  = 5 as the attack method and perform white-
box non-targeted attacks on base model B1. For other pa-
rameters, we set α = 1 in Eq. (6) and µ = 1 in Eq. (7). The
iteration number n is set tomin(+4, 1.25) following [24].
5.1. White-box and Black-box Attack
Adversarial metric attack is first evaluated with a single
model. For each query class, we generate adversarial ex-
amples on the corresponding gallery set. Thus, an adver-
sarial version of the gallery set can be stored off-line and
used for performance evaluation. The maximum magnitude
of adversarial perturbation  is set to 5 on the Market-1501
dataset in Table 2 and the DukeMTMC-reID dataset in Ta-
ble 3, which are still imperceptible to human vision (exam-
ples shown in Fig. 1). Therein, we present the networks that
we attack in rows and networks that we test on in columns.
At first glance, one can clearly observe the adversarial
effect of different metrics. For instance, the performance
of B1 decreases sharply from mAP 77.52 to 0.367 in white-
box attack, and to 22.29 in black-box attack on the Market-
1501 dataset. On the DukeMTMC-reID dataset, its perfor-
mance drops from 67.72 to 0.178 in white-box attack, and
to 18.12 in black-box attack. The state-of-the-art methods
HACNN [28] and Mancs [41] are subjected to a dramatic
performance decrease from mAP 75.28 to 37.98 and from
82.50 to 30.90, respectively on the Market-1501 dataset.
Second, the performance of white-box attack is much
lower than that of black-box attack. It is easy to under-
stand as the attack methods can generate adversarial exam-
ples that overfit the attacked model. Among the three attack
methods, I-FGSM [24] delivers the strongest white-box at-
tacks. Comparatively, MI-FGSM [6] is the most capable
of learning adversarial examples for black-box attack. This
observation is consistent across different base models, dif-
ferent state-of-the-art methods, different magnitudes of ad-
versarial perturbation1 and different datasets. This conclu-
sion is somehow contrary to that drawn by classification at-
tack [25], where non-iterative algorithms like FGSM [14]
can generally generalize better. In summary, we suggest
integrating iteration-based attack methods for adversarial
metric attack as they have a higher attack rate.
Moreover, HACNN [28] and Mancs [41] are more ro-
bust to adversarial examples compared with the four base
models. When attacked by the same set of adversarial ex-
amples, they outperform baselines by a large margin, al-
though Table 1 shows that they only achieve comparable or
even worse performances with clean images. For instance
in Table 2, when attacking B1 using MI-FGSM in black-box
setting, the best mAP achieved by the baselines is 25.53 on
the Market-1501 dataset. In comparison, HACNN reports
an mAP of 37.98 and Mancs reports an mAP of 30.90. A
possible reason is that they both have more sophisticated
modules and computational mechanisms, e.g., attention se-
lection. However, it remains unclear and needs to be inves-
1The results when  = 10 are put in the supplementary material due to
the space limitation.
Model Attack B1 B2 B3 B4 HACNN [28] Mancs [41]
B1
FGSM 7.054 33.73 36.43 30.53 44.00 43.49
I-FGSM 0.367 25.12 29.42 24.11 43.51 34.68
MI-FGSM 0.757 22.18 25.53 21.43 37.98 30.90
B2
FGSM 35.83 10.47 42.71 37.24 48.45 51.23
I-FGSM 26.87 0.458 35.96 32.91 48.06 45.69
MI-FGSM 23.01 0.960 30.77 28.47 41.84 39.80
B3
FGSM 32.84 36.89 9.178 33.91 44.40 45.95
I-FGSM 24.72 28.89 0.519 29.26 43.99 39.49
MI-FGSM 22.29 26.13 1.022 26.26 38.92 35.31
B4
FGSM 41.17 47.13 48.23 4.320 51.10 51.87
I-FGSM 38.68 47.08 48.89 0.211 54.72 50.89
MI-FGSM 32.31 39.58 41.47 0.430 47.57 43.16
Table 2. The mAP comparison of white-box attack (in shadow) and black-box attack (others) when  = 5 on the Market-1501 dataset. For
each combination of settings, the worst performances are marked in bold.
Model Attack B1 B2 B3 B4 HACNN [28] Mancs [41]
B1
FGSM 4.469 27.15 31.05 21.27 39.50 36.63
I-FGSM 0.178 22.65 28.37 17.96 41.71 32.12
MI-FGSM 0.315 17.16 22.01 14.08 33.96 24.74
B2
FGSM 27.87 5.775 34.28 27.42 41.42 42.87
I-FGSM 24.58 0.159 32.44 26.50 43.59 42.39
MI-FGSM 18.47 0.342 25.39 20.58 36.09 33.37
B3
FGSM 26.54 28.36 5.223 25.15 38.32 39.30
I-FGSM 22.43 23.96 0.191 23.30 39.98 37.11
MI-FGSM 18.12 19.28 0.387 18.93 33.29 29.85
B4
FGSM 32.02 38.37 40.77 2.071 45.52 43.70
I-FGSM 33.93 42.06 44.93 0.074 50.61 47.34
MI-FGSM 24.99 32.34 35.32 0.137 42.71 36.57
Table 3. The mAP comparison of white-box attack (in shadow) and black-box attack (others) when  = 5 on the DukeMTMC-reID dataset.
For each combination of settings, the worst performances are marked in bold.
tigated in the future which kind of modules are robust and
why they manifest robustness to adversary.
At last, the robustness of HACNN [28] and Mancs [41]
to adversary are also quite different. In most adversarial set-
tings, HACNN outperforms Mancs remarkably, revealing
that it is less vulnerable to adversary. Only when attacking
B2 or B3 using FGSM on the DukeMTMC-reID dataset,
Mancs seems to be better than HACNN (mAP 42.87 vs.
41.42). However, it should be emphasized that the base-
line performance of HACNN is much worse than that of
Mancs with clean images as presented in Table 1 (mAP
75.28 vs. 85.20 on the Market-1501 dataset and mAP 64.44
vs. 72.89 on the DukeMTMC-reID dataset). To eliminate
the influence of the differences in baseline performance, we
adopt a relative measurement of accuracy using the mAP
ratio, i.e., the ratio of mAP on adversarial examples to that
on clean images. A large mAP ratio indicates that the per-
formance decrease is smaller, thus the model is more robust
to adversary. We compare the mAP ratio of HACNN and
Mancs in Fig. 3. As shown, HACNN consistently achieves
a higher mAP ratio than Mancs in the adversarial settings.
From another point of view, achieving better perfor-
mances on benchmark datasets does not necessarily mean
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Figure 3. The ratio of mAP on adversarial examples to that on
clean images on the DukeMTMC-reID dataset.
that the algorithm has better generalization capacity. There-
fore, it would be helpful to evaluate re-ID algorithms under
the same adversarial settings to justify the potential of de-
ploying them in real environments.
5.2. Single-model and Multi-model Attack
As shown in Sec. 5.1, black-box attacks yield much
higher mAP than white-box attacks, which means that the
generated adversarial examples do not transfer well to other
models for testing. Attacking multiple models simultane-
ously can be helpful to improve the transferability.
To achieve this, we perform adversarial metric attack on
Model Attack
Market-1501 DukeMTMC-reID
Ensemb. Hold-out HACNN [28] Mancs [41] Ensemb. Hold-out HACNN [28] Mancs [41]
-B1
FGSM 20.61 26.52 40.68 39.37 13.65 20.52 35.11 32.26
I-FGSM 3.839 14.55 35.62 26.35 2.058 12.72 32.11 23.48
MI-FGSM 5.900 14.94 33.15 25.88 3.213 11.78 28.23 20.81
-B2
FGSM 19.76 29.12 39.43 36.89 13.32 22.83 34.33 30.21
I-FGSM 3.801 17.03 34.40 22.87 2.019 14.11 31.31 20.04
MI-FGSM 5.840 17.48 32.21 23.04 3.125 13.18 27.60 18.18
-B3
FGSM 20.64 32.62 40.62 38.64 13.99 26.88 35.34 31.26
I-FGSM 3.839 21.20 35.58 24.75 2.089 19.46 32.80 21.42
MI-FGSM 5.905 20.73 32.89 24.44 3.265 17.44 28.45 18.86
-B4
FGSM 21.37 26.07 38.15 36.61 13.96 17.72 32.37 29.28
I-FGSM 4.521 16.47 32.64 22.27 2.483 11.65 28.99 18.52
MI-FGSM 6.847 16.66 30.45 22.75 3.693 10.93 25.46 17.14
Table 4. The mAP comparison of multi-model attack (white-box in shadow) when  = 5. The symbol “-” indicates the name of the hold-out
base model. For each combination of settings, the worst performances are marked in bold.
an ensemble of three out of the four base models. Then,
the evaluation is done on the ensembled network and the
hold-out network. Note that in this case, attacks on the “en-
sembled network” correspond to white-box attacks as the
base models in the ensemble have been seen by the attacker
during adversarial metric attack. In contrast, attacks on the
“hold-out network” correspond to black-box attacks as this
network is not used to generate adversarial examples.
We list the performances of multi-model attacks in Ta-
ble 4. As indicated clearly, the identification rate of black-
box attacks continues to degenerate. For example, Table 2
shows that the worst performance of B1 is mAP 22.29 when
attacking the single model B3 via MI-FGSM on the Market-
1501 dataset. Under the same adversarial setting, the perfor-
mance of B1 becomes 14.94 when attacking an ensemble of
B2, B3 and B4. When attacking multiple models, the lowest
mAP of HACNN [28] is merely 30.45 on the Market-1501
dataset, a sharp decrease of 7.53 from 37.98 as reported in
Table 2 under the same adversarial settings.
5.3. Targeted and Non-targeted Attack
From Fig. 4, one can clearly observe the different effects
of non-targeted and targeted attacks.
The goal of non-targeted metric attack is to maximize the
distances (minimize the similarities) between a given probe
and adversarial gallery images. Consequently, true positives
are pushed down in the ranking list as shown in the first
two rows of Fig. 4(a). However, it is indeterminable be-
forehand what the top-ranked images will be and to which
probe the adversary will be similar as shown in the third
row. In comparison, a targeted metric attack tries to mini-
mize the distances between the given probe and the adver-
sarial gallery images. Therefore, we find a large portion of
adversarial images in top-ranked candidates in the third row
of Fig. 4(b). And it is surprising to see that the metric is so
easy to be fooled, which incorrectly retrieves male person
images when a female person image serves as the probe.
For real applications in video surveillance, the non-
targeted metric attack prevents the system from correctly
retrieving desired results, while the targeted metric attack
deliberately tricks the system into retrieving person images
of a wrong identity.
5.4. Euclidean and Mahalanobis Metric
Fig. 5 plots the mAP comparison of FGSM and I-FGSM
by varying the maximum magnitude of adversarial pertur-
bation  and a selection of distance metric on the Market-
1501 dataset.
Within our framework, distance metrics can be used
in two phases, that is, the one used to perform adversar-
ial metric attack and the one used to evaluate the perfor-
mance. For the Mahalanobis distance, we use a represen-
tative called Cross-view Quadratic Discriminant Analysis
(XQDA) [29]. Unfortunately, by integrating metric learn-
ing with deep features, we do not observe an improvement
of baseline performance, despite the fact that metric learn-
ing is extensively proven to be compatible with non-deep
features (e.g., LOMO [29], GOG [34]). We obtain a rank-
1 accuracy of 89.73 and an mAP of 75.86 using XQDA,
lower than the rank-1 accuracy of 91.30 and mAP of 77.52
achieved by the Euclidean distance reported in Table 1.
From Fig. 5, it is unsurprising to observe that the perfor-
mance of different metric combinations decreases quickly
as the maximum magnitude of adversarial perturbation  in-
creases. We also note that the iteration-based attack meth-
ods such as I-FGSM and MI-FGSM can severely mislead
the distance metric with 5-pixel perturbations.
Second, we observe an interesting phenomenon which is
consistent with different attack methods. When attacking
the Euclidean distance and testing with XQDA, the perfor-
mance is better than the setting where attacking and testing
are both carried out with the Euclidean distance. This is also
the case when we attack XQDA and test with the Euclidean
distance. In other words, it is beneficial to adversarial met-
Probe
Ranking List
Original Images
Adversary
1 (↓) 3 (↓) 4 (↓) 5 (↓) 6 (↓) 7 (↓) 8 (↓) 9 (↓) 10 (↓) 11 (↓)
3 4 5 6 7 8 91 2 10
19704 8465 11534 16985 19729 19728 19712 19718 19722 19724
(a)
3 4 5 6 7 8 91 2 10
Probe
Ranking List
Original Images
Adversary
16792 18544 18948 17148 16886 9485 19313 16033 19188 19458
3 (↑) 4 (↑) 5 (↑) 6 (↑) 7 (↑) 8 (↑) 9 (↑) 11 (↑) 12 (↑) 15 (↑)
(b)
Figure 4. Two representative ranking lists of two probe images for non-targeted attack (a) and targeted attack (b). We mark the ranking
position of each gallery image on its top and do not elaborately exclude the distractor images and those captured by the same camera as the
probe. The gallery images with proper ranking positions (i.e., true positives and false negatives) are marked in blue, otherwise in red.
Gallery
B1 B2 B3 B4
#N #M #I #N #M #I #N #M #I #N #M #I
Original 77.52 76.69 -1.07% 78.21 76.74 -1.87% 79.08 77.25 -2.31% 67.86 59.87 -11.7%
Adv. (B1) 0.367 74.14 +2.0e4% 25.12 70.54 +180% 29.42 72.45 +146% 24.11 53.58 +122%
Adv. (B2) 26.87 72.64 +170% 0.458 76.23 +1.6e4% 35.96 72.82 +102% 32.91 52.81 +60.4%
Adv. (B3) 24.72 70.46 +185% 28.89 68.67 +137% 0.519 76.93 +1.4e4% 29.26 51.03 +74.4%
Adv. (B4) 38.68 72.65 +87.8% 47.08 72.14 +53.2% 48.89 73.41 +50.1% 0.211 57.45 +2.7e4%
Table 5. The mAP comparison between normally trained models (denoted by #N) and metric-preserving models (denoted by #M) on the
Market-1501 dataset. #I means the relative improvement.
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Figure 5. The mAP comparison of FGSM (a) and I-FGSM (b) by
varying the maximum magnitude of adversarial perturbation  and
a selection of distance metric. In the legend, the part before symbol
“/” denotes the metric loss used for metric attack and the part after
“/” denotes the metric used to evaluate the performance.
ric defense if we use different metrics for metric attack and
performance evaluation. From another perspective, it can be
interpreted by the conclusion drawn in Sec. 5.1, i.e., we can
take the change of metrics as a kind of black-box attack. In
other words, we are using adversarial examples generated
with a model using a certain distance metric to test another
model which differs from the original model in its choice of
distance metric.
5.5. Evaluating Adversarial Metric Defense
In Table 5, we evaluate metric defense by comparing
the performance of normally trained models with metric-
preserving models on the Market-1501 dataset. When test-
ing the original clean gallery set, a slight performance de-
crease, generally smaller than 10%, is observed after using
metric-preserving models. However, when purely testing
the adversarial version of gallery images, the performance
is significantly improved. For instance, when attacking B3
and testing on B1, the performance is originally 24.72, then
improved to 70.46 with a relative improvement of 185%.
In real video surveillance, it can improve the robustness of
re-ID systems by deploying metric-preserving models.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we have studied the adversarial effects in
person re-identification (re-ID). By observing that most ex-
isting works on adversarial examples only perform classifi-
cation attacks, we propose the adversarial metric attack as a
parallel methodology to be used in metric analysis.
By performing metric attack, adversarial examples can
be easily generated for person re-identification. The latest
state-of-the-art re-ID algorithms suffer a dramatic perfor-
mance drop when they are attacked by the adversarial exam-
ples generated in this work, exposing the potential security
issue of deploying re-ID algorithms in real video surveil-
lance systems. To facilitate the development of metric at-
tack in person re-identification, we have benchmarked and
introduced various adversarial settings, including white-
box and black-box attack, targeted and non-targeted attack,
single-model and multi-model attack, etc. Extensive exper-
iments on two large scale re-ID datasets have reached some
useful conclusions, which can be a helpful reference for
future works. Moreover, benefiting from adversarial met-
ric attack, we present an early attempt of training metric-
preserving networks to significantly improve the robustness
of re-ID models to adversary.
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